Trying to see through the fog of war
I am still somewhat surprised by how quickly Western media have turned into a single, top-down decided narrative regarding the war in Ukraine. Maybe after the pandemic and its array of head-scratching decisions, I should not be.
Essentially, I believe the situation is a lot less good for Ukraine than we are told, and it will have major consequences for European economies.
Let’s first look at all the predictions/narratives that proved untrue, and what is the ongoing situation.
And then I will try to see what Russia’s next moves could be and their consequence, both geopolitical and economical.
An information war
Here we go
Let me start by saying this is a topic I wanted to avoid so far.
First because as an Estonian resident, I am directly concerned by the possibility of a worsening of the Ukraine war. So I really cannot claim to be fully objective and rational about it.
Secondly, this has turned into a VERY emotional topic. Pro-Russians are unable to admit the shortcomings of the Russian army. And pro-Ukrainians treat any honest questioning as some sort of evil conspiracy against Ukraine.
So it frankly felt easier to avoid the topic entirely. But I expect new developments to come very soon. And It seems to me that most of my readers will not be aware of them, so I feel I need to write this article.
This will have wide ramifications on oil & gas markets, European economies, Eurasia, and the world at large.
As usual, I will try to write this from an as-objective-as-possible point of view.
What we have been told
Initially, a lot of commentators feared that Ukraine would fold under pressure in a matter of days or weeks. Frankly, I somewhat expected it myself.
So it came as a surprise for the world at large, Russian leadership included, that the resistance was much fiercer than expected. I suspect even the Ukrainian leadership was not so sure about it initially.
As a reaction, this led to comments about how corrupt, inefficient, and inept the Russian army was. From now on, the authorized narrative has just been on how many weapons should be sent to Ukraine and when it will win the war.
Following this narrative, we were told during the first weeks that the Russian army was going to soon run out of artillery shells and ammunition. And was talking about such heavy losses that it was also soon going to run out of tanks, armored vehicles, and men.
6 months later, the Russian artillery still shoots 3x-10x more shells at the Ukrainians than they can fire back. And despite the recent retreat, it seems dubious that Russia is running out of troops any time soon.
In the same vein, we were told sanctions would collapse the Russian economy overnight. So far, Russia is making MORE money from exports than before the war … They might have no Starbucks anymore, but at best, only long-term damage will have any sort of effect. Meanwhile, a wave of bankruptcy is certain in the EU.
So what happened?
The real reasons Russia underperformed
I think there is a series of causes for Russia's initial underperformance. If corruption is certainly a thing, its influence has been grossly overstated.
1/ The poor assessment of the national feeling in Ukraine.
The pro-Russia part of the Ukrainian population might be supportive of Putin, but did little to help the army in practice. In parallel, a massive push against the invasion swept through Ukrainian society.
So instead of the expected quick collapse, resistance held and troops kept the front line. Failing to storm Kiev airport did not help either.
Most of the initial attack was aimed at causing a quick surrender. As it didn’t happen, the plan had to change.
2/ The power of new military technology
It seems no analyst among the large armies of the world properly realized the dramatic change the use of drones brought to the battlefield. This is despite the clear force multiplier effect they had in Syria and more recently in the Armenia-Azerbaidjan conflict.
The Azeri have managed to completely annihilate the Armenian positions with minimal losses and minimal costs, using simple and cheap drones. It secured them a crushing and historic victory.
In the same way, Ukrainians effectively used drones for reconnaissance, bombing, etc… This gave the less equipped Ukrainians a surprising ability to inflict massive damage to the invading forces. Especially with Russian troops seemingly very overconfident.
Drones’ camera footage also made for a great propaganda tool, with each kill registered and quickly uploaded online. With no such image from the other side, a clear winner seems to appear on social media.
In addition to drones, it is now clear that man-held missiles like the Javelin are stronger than tanks’ defense systems. Cheaper, more mobile, and easy to conceal, they are essentially making any dense environment like a city absolutely deadly for tanks. It took a while for the Russian army to admit it and act accordingly.
Man-held missiles are also powerful against low-flying aircraft and helicopters. Stingers already used against the Soviets in Afghanistan prove again deadly against Russian forces. This nullifies an expensive part of the Russian advantage.
Generals always fight the last war. And smaller countries usually grab the strategic initiative. This played massively in Ukraine’s favor.
3/ Limited forces
Now this will be a controversial point. It is nevertheless important to make it.
Ukraine is fighting a total war. It has ordered full mobilization, banned men of fighting age to leave the country, does everything it can to get as many weapons as possible, and is likely suffering horrific losses of life, both military and civilian.
Parts of its territory are occupied and entire cities are already destroyed, like Mariupol (half a million inhabitants). Its currency is inflating away fast, despite tens of billions of support from NATO countries.
Russia on the other hand is using just a small part of its forces. The number of invading troops is estimated between 150,000 to 250,000. This is a far cry from the estimated 1.35 million troops Russia claims to have in its army. Even if this number was bloated by half compared to the real one, it would still make 675,000 troops.
Source: Statistica
And these numbers are BEFORE any mobilization by Russia. Multiplying by 2x or even 4x the invading forces would not be a terrible stretch for Russia. Yes, mobilization might be unpopular, but I doubt it would lead to enough unrest to be a problem.
I think calling the war a “Special Military Operation” is rather ridiculous. Still, so far, this is indeed a somewhat "limited” war from Russia’s point of view.
4/ Relative restraint
This will be an even more controversial point. During the first 1-3 months, Russia actually limited the damage it inflicted on Ukraine.
I say that by comparing the attack to similar conflicts like the US-led bombing of Serbia, Iraq, or Lybia. The shock-and-awe tactic is designed to inflict the maximum of damage quickly, forcing a surrender.
First, you destroy the air defense. Then you bomb pretty much everything of use to the target: power plants, electric networks, pipelines, water stations, bridges, railroads, harbors, factories, TV stations, etc…
The goal is to obtain a surrender with little to no need for ground fighting. Any armed force going in the open to ripost must be annihilated with overwhelming firepower.
If Russia had done so, Ukraine would have for the last 6 months no power, water, gas, trains, etc… Because they demonstrated their ability to hit targets far behind the frontline, like ammo depots or training centers, it means that it is a choice.
Most likely Russia had wanted to conquer Ukraine “intact”.
Over time it accepted the necessity of localized citywide destruction, like Mariupol, when it was needed to destroy Ukrainian units, especially notorious ones like the Azov battalion.
A change in strategy
The beginning of the invasion went badly for Russia. Miscalculation of the political stability, new weaponry, and an impressive bunker network in the Donbas blocked its advance.
The problems for Ukraine started from there.
Negating new technology advantages
Javelins are only useful against exposed tanks. Russia stopped sending its tanks to slaughter.
Drones are great for reconnaissance. So much so that Russia is now putting its own to massive use. To the point that civilian Chinese drone maker DJI had to distance itself from Russia in April. If Ukraine can use drones to spot artillery, so can Russia. Drones are also great at destroying artillery pieces. In my last Iran report, I mentioned increased Iran-Russia collaboration.
Russia is now using Chinese civilian drones to find targets, and then use Iran-made drones to destroy the precious NATO-supplied artillery pieces used by Ukraine, according to the Wall Street Journal.
It also appears that Russia is increasingly able to degrade Ukrainian communication, which is likely to interfere with drone warfare as well.
Leveraging artillery
Russia refuses to use a full shock-and-awe powered by the air force. It cannot use its armored forces either, because of Javelin missiles.
Removing air power pushes back to WWII tactics.
Removed tanks pushes back to WWI tactics: a rather static front, dominated by artillery duels, with the occasional tentative to storm weak points with infantry.
The problem is that Russia’s military doctrine is VERY heavy on artillery.
A typical land power, Russia has very little force projection capacity. Its navy is small, weak, and outdated. Its air force is a mix of defensive and nuclear deterrence. No aircraft carriers, no amphibious vehicles, no Marines Corp.
So, since WWII, its tactic has always been to slowly advance under an unrelenting barrage of fire. Hold your ground, and progress or retreat slowly.
The enemy is hidden in an apartment building ahead and might have Javelins or heavy guns? Bomb it into oblivion for a day or two. No building, no problem. Move to the next building.
This is a brutal, collateral damage-heavy tactic. But it works. This is how Russia conquered Mariupol, or what’s left of it.
Russia has been firing between 20,000 and 60,000 shells and missiles PER DAY. This is in contrast to at most 6,000 per day for Ukraine. So when the Ukrainian artillery tries to destroy the Russian one, they are met with a barrage of fire 3x to x10 larger.
This does not bode well for the long-term survival of Ukrainian artillery. And limits greatly its ability to support the rest of the forces.
This amount of firepower negates the efficiency of bunker fortification. No fixed defense can last forever, or at least its defenders cannot.
This is now a WWI-style war of attrition. What matter is who runs out of artillery or shells first.
Shock and Awe
Finally, it is becoming clear to me that Russia is giving up on its restraint. Beyond increasing troops number, through more of the standing army and the reserve.
We had a warning about it in the last few days after the Ukrainian army managed to push back on some of the Russian lines on the north front.
In response, a cruise missile strike hit a series of civilian infrastructure targets, including the transformers or a nuclear power plant (see thread below). To make the message even more obvious, the strikes also hit a dam in Zelensky’s home town.
Simply put, a bully sent the message “stop fighting back, or I’ll really hurt you”. Relations between nation states are essentially bullies intimidating each other, fighting each other or banding together against another one; this is not really surprising.
So we should expect what was tactically needed, like the flattening of Mariupol to get extended to full shock-and-awe attacks. Doing it before winter will be extra efficient.
The idea will be to cripple Ukraine's infrastructure so much that Western weapons cannot even be brought to the front line, nor any economic activity be maintained.
What’s next
Escalation to full destruction of Ukraine's infrastructure will have a series of consequences.
1/ An acceptation of permanent isolation
From Russia's perspective, every tentative of integrating into the Western power structure has been rejected since the 1990s. Sanctions, being cut off from trade and such is now an accepted reality in the Kremlin.
This means the economic future of Russia will be entirely directed toward Eurasia, especially what I dubbed “the Eurasian Tripod”: Russia/China/Iran.
It will also make mobilization likely, as now Russia will consider itself in a war against all of NATO, even if the war has limits like not bombing directly NATO countries.
So what matters then for Russia is damaging as much as possible the enemy while still staying short of open war with NATO.
2/ Full-blown hybrid war with Europe
Some might claim this is already the case, but even then, it will scale up radically. The first step is shutting down gas and oil even before the schedule the EU wanted. This should make the winter of 2023 especially dramatic in Europe.
Openly supporting regional separatism, political radicals, or even terrorism will not be off-limits.
In response, much harder sanctions and inference on Russian exports is likely.
3/ Global energy and food crisis
Russia will not manage to export all the gas and oil it used to export to Europe. At least not for years, until there are more tankers and pipelines available. Even with Europe in a Depression (with a capital D), this should send oil prices up.
In this scenario, Europe's fertilizer production does not recover. But neither do Russian fertilizers manage to leave the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. Combined with collapsing food production in Ukraine, this guarantees a global food crisis.
4/ “Surprising” setback for Ukraine
If the transformers of the power plants and railroad are off, the country will quickly run out of fuel, power, and transportation. This will make the supply to the front line of 6,000 shells per day almost impossible.
Combined with a doubling or tripling of Russian numbers + the losses of much of the Dombas fortifications, this should be trouble for the Ukrainian army.
The massive attacks on civilians of the shock and awe strategy will inevitably be leading to countless war crimes. It will also create a devastating wave of refugees.
I really hope EU countries and Russia are preparing the infrastructure to welcome the extra millions of women, children, and elderly fleeing freezing to death after the collapse of Ukraine's infrastructure.
As EU officials seem in denial of even the trouble to supply their own population, I somehow doubt it.
Conclusion
I would like to finish this article on a less grim note, but I do not see how.
Even if Ukraine keeps winning battles, this will just speed up the decision for Russia to entire total war footing as well, something yet to happen.
So the situation in Ukraine will degrade further, and Russia will likely mobilize more troops and deploy more efficient and brutal tactics. For now, this still falls short of WW3, as China is at best supporting Russia through trade.
The losers are like always civilians caught in the crossfire of geopolitical games, as well as unwilling soldiers forced into the conflict.
So let’s pray this is the worst and most depressing prediction and analysis I will ever have to make.
And if you live in Europe, take care, stay safe and be kind.